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The ICTS Sector 
As with any industry sector, the path followed in the development of the Information and 
Communications Technology and services (ICTS) sector has been historically, and continues 
to be, shaped by the interaction of technological, economic and political forces.  
Technological factors contribute the set of technically feasible products and services, 
economic factors surrounding supply and demand determine which of these it is it is possible 
and desirable to implement commercially, and policy, law and regulation contribute to 
shaping the design of the markets in which ICTS are produced and exchanged.  Although all 
three components interact, sector outcomes are determined principally by the actions within 
the sphere of policy, law and regulation, as a consequence of the ultimate powers conferred 
on this component to determine both the applications, products and services will be 
exchanged in the markets that ensue, and the distribution of the net benefits that arise, as 
illustrated in Figure 11.   
 
Whilst technological and economic factors contribute the set of feasible products and services 
and create the opportunities for innovative new products and services to diffuse, the powers 
granted to policy-makers, regulators and legislators (hereinafter collectively referred to as the 
‘regulatory institutions’) to bind all other participants to act according to their will confers 
upon them the ability to support, direct and constrain all current and future technological and 
economic opportunities arising from interactions in the sector.  Only those products and 
services sanctioned by the regulatory institutions will be produced and traded, and the terms 
of their trade must also satisfy regulatory imperatives.  The exercise of such powers has 
influenced past outcomes, and continues to influence participation and outcomes in current 
and future markets.  Thus, via systemic feedback effects, regulatory institutions are 
instrumental in determining the nature and direction of future technological and economic 
developments, and hence sector outcomes.   
 
Understanding why specific outcomes have emerged and predicting likely future outcomes in 
the ICTS sector would appear to depend principally upon understanding the nature and 
function of the relevant regulatory institutions.  Such understanding would also appear to be 
crucial in assessing how changes to the regulatory institutions (either exogenously or 
endogenously imposed) will affect sector outcomes, in both the short and long terms.   
However, such understandings must necessarily take into account not only the regulatory 
institutions themselves, but also the wider context in which they operate, as per Figure 1.   
                                                     
1This paragraph draws on material from Professor Melody’s lecture “Political Economy of ICTs”, Monday August 27 2006.     
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 This paper takes as a starting point for developing deeper understandings the assumption that 
both regulatory bodies and the sectors in which they operate are institutions.  The body of 
literature about the operation of institutions provides a means of understanding the actors, 
arrangements, rules and culture, values and norms that shape the ICTS sector.  With this 
understanding, it is then possible to analyse using the same frameworks how these same 
forces act upon and shape the regulatory institutions, and ultimately how the regulatory 
institutions themselves contribute to shaping the wider ICTS sector in which they operate.  
The order of the paper is as follows: Section 1 describes the institutional economics 
conceptualisation of institutions, and a specific model of interactions in complex institutional 
systems proposed by Koppenjan and Groeneweld (2005).  Section two then applies this model 
to explore structures, entities and interactions within the ICTS sector generally, and those 
interactions specifically associated with the evolution and functioning of regulatory 
institutions.  Finally, section three takes the sector-specific application of the model from 
section two and applies it in the specific circumstances of the ICTS sector and regulatory 
change in the European Union in order to draw insights that may contribute to explaining why 
the attempts to build a common telecommunications market in the European Union have 
failed to deliver the desired outcomes, despite substantial alterations to the regulatory 
institutions designed to bring them about.   
 
An Institutional Economics View of Institutions 
From the perspective of institutional economics, all institutions are “a set of rules that regulate 
the interaction between parties involved in the functioning of a (technological) system”2 - that 
is, “a system of rules that structure the course of actions that a set of actors may choose”3 
which is accepted by those involved, is used in practice, and has a certain degree of durability 
(i.e. it is not transitory).   An institution “co-ordinates the positions, relations and behaviour of 
the parties that own and operate the system”4, and will become established and persist 
typically because, on balance, the costs and risks incurred by its existence and activities are 
outweighed by the benefits ensuing5.  Whilst formal structures and accountabilities form part 
of the set of rules governing the operation of the institution, “how decisions are made in and 
                                                     
2 Koppenjan and Groenewegen, (2005) p 3. 
3 Scharpf, 1997 cited by Koppenjan and Groenewegen (2005) p 3.     
4 Koppenjan and Groenewegen, (2005) p 1. 
5 The test of benefits outweighing costs is the typical economic test of the long-term viability of an organisation.  It is noted, 
however, that institutions that are not subject to normal commercial tests may persist, even though  they are economically 
unviable, for example, as a consequence of legislative mandate (e.g. statutory bodies) or soft budget constraints (e.g. donors who 
provide funds without expectation of a monetary return).  See Hansmann (1996) for a discussion on the creation and durability of 
such organizations.   
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about the system, and how the system is used, determines its functioning”6.   Typically, 
multiple parties are involved, with participation often transcending the boundaries of any one 
organisation.   
 
Koppenjan and Groenewegen (2005), building upon Williamson (1979; 1998), propose that 
interactions in complex institutional systems can be analysed on four levels: 
1. individual actors (encompassing individual agents, firms, households) and their 
interactions (transactions); 
2. institutional arrangements (governance arrangements) designed to co-ordinate 
specific transactions among multiple actors; 
3. legal rules that set the formal ‘rules of the game’ and determine the legal 
positions of players and mechanisms available to co-ordinate transactions; and 
4. cultures, values, norms and attitudes, that constitute the ‘informal rules of the 
game’, influencing the mindset of agents at level 1 and thereby influencing the 
problems identified, feasible solutions considered and the kinds of incentive 
structures which are acceptable and will be effective7. 
 
The ‘levels’ model distinguishes between the effects of formal (levels 2 and 3) and  informal 
(levels 1 and 4) structures, and enables specification of the relationships occurring between 
each of the different levels.  In particular, a higher level constrains and shapes the lower ones, 
and lower levels have an influence on developments occurring in higher ones8.  Whilst 
cultures, values, norms and attitudes shape formal laws which constrain the types of 
relationships and structures that can exist, individuals invest in relationships with the specific 
objective of changing the formal rules.  Furthermore, the model recognises that institutions 
are embedded in a larger context, so are subject to change as a consequence of changes in this 
wider contextual environment.  Whereas the informal arrangements are continually changing 
incrementally (as a consequence of either purposeful or unconscious behaviour) in response 
to these environmental changes, the formal arrangements, whilst capable of undergoing 
change, are tend to be more rigid.  The absence of changes to the formal institutions may 
imply a degree of permanence in the institutional structure that is illusionary, simply because 
the changes to the informal arrangements unfold so slowly or opaquely that they go unnoticed 
by the actors involved.   
 
                                                     
6 Koppenjan and Groenewegen, (2005), p 2.   
7 Ibid, pp 5-6.   
8 ‘Higher’ in this respect refers to the number of the layer – i.e. layer 4 is higher than layers 1, 2 and 3.  
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System stability and effective functioning relies upon the congruence of arrangements at each 
level, suggesting a need for constant changes to both the formal and informal arrangements in 
response to changes in each other and in the wider context.  However, constant change may 
be destabilising, as it creates uncertainty.   On the one hand, the stability that formal 
arrangements confer reduces uncertainty, thereby facilitating transactions that may not have 
occurred had uncertainty persisted.  On the other hand, unchanging formal arrangements 
simultaneously cement into place the current set of rules of the game which necessarily, due 
to the bounded rationality and biases of those involved in their creation and maintenance, are 
not neutral.  The very existence of rules makes it easier for some actors to ‘play the game’ and 
‘win’ than others, thereby incentivising investment in activities designed to change or retain 
rules in order to secure individual distributive advantages9.  Indeed, some formal rules may be 
consciously designed to be difficult to change specifically to circumvent institutional 
vulnerability to self-interested strategic manipulation and transaction-harming uncertainty.  
However, these impediments to change prevent the institution from responding in a timely 
manner to unexpected disruptive changes or an increase in the pace of change in the wider 
environment, raising the risk that the institution loses its effectiveness or at worst becomes 
irrelevant10.    
 
Koppenjan and Groenewegen also propose that, as a consequence of their creation being the 
outcome of informal and incremental processes, the customised formal and informal 
arrangements developed within each institution are the unique manifestations of the historical 
learning and experiences of the relevant parties interacting over a long period of time in a 
specific context.  Thus, a set of institutional arrangements developed in one context will not 
necessarily be optimal when transferred into in another context, or where the actors involved 
are different individuals and firms, whose past activities have conditioned the nature of their 
relations.  Furthermore, the institutional arrangements that have evolved will likely reflect the 
different levels of access that individuals and groups at level 1 have had at different times 
with those with the power to change formal arrangements at level 2, as well as a variety of 
compromises that have been struck for pragmatic reasons when multiple parties have been 
unable to negotiate the adoption of the set of rules that each initially preferred and advocated 
for.   
 
                                                     
9 North (1990).   
10 Christensen (1997, 2006); Bower and Christensen (1995, 1996).   
10/6/2006 - 5 - 
Regulatory Institutions in the Context of the ICTS Sector 
At the broadest level, the ICTS sector as depicted in Figure 1 constitutes an institution 
wherein the ‘technologies’ component give rise to applications (that is, infrastructures and 
appliances) which are packaged into commercial products and services (e.g. residential fixed 
line telephony, Internet services) by service providers and exchanged with consumers via 
markets.  Policies determining how the sector/institution will operate become the regulations, 
implemented by regulatory institutions, binding the behaviour and interactions of all the other 
parties.   
 
Applying the ‘levels’ model to the ICTS sector leads to the identification of the various 
elements as follows: 
1. The ‘individual actors’ are the individuals and firms participating in the creation, 
provision, exchange and consumption of applications and services – that is, 
technology and application developers and manufacturers, infrastructure and 
application providers, service providers and consumers – and those participating 
directly in the creation, implementation and enforcement of policies – politicians, 
civil servants, agents of the regulatory bodies, lawyers, lobbyists etc as 
individuals, as well as the agencies in which they operate (e.g. regulatory 
authorities, government departments, political parties, national executives, 
industry associations, courts).  As ICTS sector activities embrace aspects of 
‘public goods’ (e.g. universal service), the body of relevant actors also include 
‘the public’ collectively (e.g. as represented by consumer associations and other 
advocacy groups), and individual members of the public, with an interest not just 
in their own consumption of services, but also the consumption of services by 
others in the community.   
2. The ‘institutional arrangements’ co-ordinating the activities of the sector 
comprise principally the commercial agreements between each of the interacting 
participants – for example, the access agreements between service providers and 
infrastructure providers for use of installed platforms; the service agreements 
between Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and end consumers; the employment 
agreements between applications developers and their research and development 
staff; the agreements between governments as consumers and applications 
providers to install infrastructures in areas where commercial installation is 
unviable.  These arrangements also include the formal agreements governing 
creation of and participation by individuals in collective groups, such as industry 
associations and lobby groups.  Agreements between regulatory authorities and 
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actors about the processes via which regulatory activities are undertaken (aside 
from those covered by statutes) also fall into this layer (e.g. consultation 
processes, individual regulatory agreements with specific providers), along with 
the governance agreements via which all actor-agents (either individuals or 
collective groups) report to and are accountable to their principals for their 
activities.   
3. The ‘legal rules’ include the typical legal frameworks under which the 
commercial and governanceactivities in level 2 take place, as well as the 
regulatory ‘rules of the game’ specific to the sector which are enshrined in 
statutes (e.g. mandatory open access arrangements).   These rules also include the 
formal legislative specification of the powers conferred upon regulatory bodies 
and specific individuals (i.e. the regulator)11.  These rules also include the 
statutory rights by which actors may participate in the processes in which these 
powers and rules are determined (i.e. constitutional processes, such as 
‘democratic participation’ in matters of government).     
4. The cultures, norms values and attitudes that comprise level four necessarily 
include factors relating to the nationality, ethnicity, sub-sectors of activity and the 
path-dependent history of interactions the actors involved. A key observation is 
that different sets of cultures, norms, values and attitudes apply to different actors 
and institutions within the sector. Thus, distinguishably different sets of industry 
and sub-sector ‘cultures’ prevail, and each of these has undergone its own 
specific development trajectory.  Moreover, the nature of the institutions and 
interactions may lead to the development of different cultures in different 
geographical, commercial or political contexts.  For example the cultures, norms 
values and attitudes that have developed from transacting in a sector where 
suppliers are monopolists will differ from those developed where suppliers are 
competing more vigorously.  Different institutional arrangements will also lead to 
different cultures.  For example, the cultures, norms values and attitudes that 
evolve when investment in firms has been built up from taxpayer or ratepayer 
investments and governed by collective, ‘community’ trustees will differ from 
those where investment comes from a small set of private sector individuals.  
Such differences also distinguish individual firms and technology subsectors (e.g. 
telephony infrastructure, computer, Internet Service Provision), for a variety of 
reasons, including the imprint that individuals with different skills and skill mixes 
                                                     
11 Note here the difference between the ‘institutional arrangements’ by which the regulatory bodies and regulators carry out their  
designated activities (level 2) and the process by which the powers to undertake specific activities are created and conferred 
(level 3).   
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place upon specific firms, and the different roles played by different technologies 
in different parts of the value chain leading to different orientations of firms (e.g. 
industry versus consumer/retail).  One very obvious difference that emerges is the 
distinction between the commercial and professional cultures, norms and values 
of firms trading in commercial markets, and the ‘civil service’, ‘citizenry’ and 
‘public good’ cultures, norms and values pertaining to regulatory, government 
and ‘civil society’ actors and their processes.   
 
The ‘levels’ analysis of the ICTS sector ‘meta-institution’ allows some key insights to be 
gained into some of the important differences that characterise the regulatory institutions from 
those institutions and individuals whose interactions they are charged with influencing.  Most 
obviously, the different cultures, norms, values and attitudes (as per level 4) prevailing in 
regulatory institutions are likely to be very different from those influencing the relationships  
within and between actors engaged principally in the ‘technology’ and ‘markets’ sub-sectors 
of the ICTS sector (as per level 2).  This difference is both a cause and a consequence of the 
different types of interactions actors primarily associated with the regulatory institutions must 
carry out.   
 
The activities undertaken by agents of regulatory institutions at level 2 principally relate to 
implementing, monitoring and enforcing laws enacted at level 3, and in advising the actors 
with the key responsibility for making decisions about the laws and rules pertaining at level 3 
on an appropriate set of legal rules and policies to apply.  The powers granted to regulatory 
agents by the level 3 arrangements ensure that the arrangements that they participate in at 
level 2 carry some of the force of level 3 rules, in that they can constrain the nature of the 
institutional arrangements of, and interactions between, all other actors in the sector.  For 
example, regulators typically have a role to play in facilitating other actors to reach their own 
agreements at level 2, with the power to impose terms and conditions, as allowed by level 3 
rules, only being utilised if the level 2 activities fail to deliver a satisfactory outcome.  
Consequently, the tasks undertaken by regulatory institutions require actors with different 
skills from those employed by institutions in other parts of the sector.  The consequence is, 
firstly, a self-selection of actors into different parts of the sector based upon professional skill 
differences, and ultimately a different set of cultures based upon the professional differences 
that likely become self-perpetuating as self-selection becomes increasingly accentuated by 
demand for, and supply of, increasingly specialised staff.   
 
As the cultural differences between the regulatory institutions and the regulated entities 
increase, it becomes harder for regulatory agents with incongruent skill sets to assess the 
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nature and efficacy of the interactions between other sector actors, and to advise the level 3 
decision-makers upon appropriate changes to the formal laws. Whilst the skill lack might be 
consciously addressed by targeted recruiting, such appointments risk upsetting the congruence 
between the ‘civil service’, regulatory cultures of level 4, the nature of the activities covered 
by the agreements at level 2, and the specific tasks required to be undertaken by the new 
employees.  Whilst information may improve, operational effectiveness with respect to 
regulatory tasks may decrease, as the activities of the new employees may be insufficiently 
guided by the prevailing cultures where this is necessary.  If the skill incongruence is not 
addressed, then the information asymmetry increases, leading to regulatory institutions that 
are out of touch with key activities in the sector.  Important sectoral changes may not be 
identified and acted upon, leading to increasingly ineffective regulatory processes, as 
regulators seek to regulate activities or behaviour that are no longer as important or relevant, 
or fail to identify the need to regulate nascent activities.   
 
The apparent inability of regulatory institutions skilled in the task of regulating voice-based 
telephony providers to respond rapidly and effectively to sector changes resulting from the 
disaggregation of service providers from infrastructure providers and the convergence of 
voice, internet and entertainment applications12 may in part be plausibly attributable to 
increasing cultural separation between technological developments, commercial markets and 
regulatory institutions.  Whereas service providers are typically quick to change skill sets and 
associated institutional arrangements on the basis of economic opportunities offered by new 
technologies, as determined by their overriding commercial culture and values (indeed, such 
recruiting patterns actually reinforce the prevailing commercial cultures in these institutions), 
regulatory institutions lacking the same culture of commercial imperatives to shape selection 
of actors and design of institutional arrangements cannot respond as quickly, simply because 
the commercial opportunities may not be detected early.  Moreover, even when they are 
detected, and changes are made to recruit individuals with new skills, it may be difficult to 
integrate the new individuals effectively into an organisation where the actions of the majority 
of actors continue to be conditioned by pre-existing cultures, thereby limiting the 
effectiveness of the new employees.   Such recruitment may be successful only if there is 
simultaneously a conscious attempt to change the cultures, norms, values and attitudes of the 
entire regulatory institution.  Yet such a change may be neither desirable overall (e.g. it may 
be incongruent with other aspects of the regulatory task that have not changed, such as data 
                                                     
12 For a discussion of these issues, see Melody (2005).   
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collection) nor easily achievable13.  Hence, the status quo typically prevails and regulatory 
effectiveness declines.   
 
The inherent tensions identified by the incongruence of cultures and activities are further 
exacerbated by the fact that regulatory institutions are directly agents of those charged with 
making the level 3 decisions that both set the regulatory institutions’ agendas and shape their 
formal governance arrangements.  The blurring of the locus of ultimate control of the formal 
rules controlling the regulatory institutions between level 2 and level 3 enables all actors in 
the sector a ‘double opportunity’ to influence the activities that the regulatory institutions 
undertake at level 2.  Actors can utilise interactions at level 2 to shape rules and outcomes, as 
well as exercising their constitutional rights as participants in the wider setting of the 
legislative and regulatory ‘rules of the game’ at level 3.  For example, actors dissatisfied with 
regulatory actions at level 2 can seek to redress this dissatisfaction by exerting the right of all 
actors as citizens of the sovereign entity to seek changes to the level 3 rules that govern the 
setting of the rules at level 2.   
 
The ‘double opportunity’ is possible only because the regulatory institution is an instrument 
of government.  There is no such universal right available to all sector participants to 
participate in changing the nature of, nor the processes of setting, the rules governing 
activities of private, shareholder-owned firms or markets via any means other than their 
normal commercial interactions with the institution. Where incongruities arise in (firm 
governance) or between (marketplace rules) the levels in respect of private sector institutions, 
changes to the rules of the game are enacted within the level 2 arrangements set at level 2 
(e.g. interested stakeholders changing governance rules, courts arbitrating commercial 
contract disputes or hearing appeals against regulatory processes).  Recourse to level 3 
changes is typically rarely used, except in cases where the overriding level 3 rules lack clarity 
or are demonstrably unfair.  On the one hand, sovereign governments are likely to be reluctant 
to change the level 3 rules frequently as a result of constituent petitions, as frequent changes 
increase uncertainty that likely ultimately will harm sector performance (indeed, devolution 
of disputes to courts who, via level 2 arrangements, rely strongly upon precedents ensures that 
the status quo prevails unless there is a need to address an issue not covered by previous 
decisions).  The potential for destabilisation is one of the reasons why agencies such as the 
ITU recommend the creation of level 3 rules that minimise the ability for political bodies, 
whose predominant arena of action is in level 3 changes, to interfere with the day-to-day 
                                                     
13 Robbins et al. (1994) chapter 18.   
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activities of regulators, whose activities are focused at level 214.  On the other hand, failure to 
make changes may lead to the entrenchment of informational asymmetries that decrease 
regulatory performance, which in turn may lead to increased dissatisfaction with regulatory 
actions and subsequently even greater pressure for level 3 changes to occur.    
 
EU Regulatory Institutions and the ‘Failure’ to Form a Common 
Telecommunications Market  
Based upon the insights above it would appear that an institutional analysis of regulatory 
institutions, with reference to their wider ICTS sector contexts, provides a useful means to 
explore some of the key questions about the development of specific sector outcomes.  As an 
example, the balance of this paper illustrates how institutional analysis of regulatory 
institutions may assist in explaining why, despite original intentions, the changes to laws and 
rules (level 3) and the formation and the creation of a variety of common regulatory 
institutions (level 1) with commonly agreed operational rules (level 2), the objective of 
creating a single common market for telecommunications in the European Union appears to 
have failed.  The following analysis is not intended to be a comprehensive explanation, but 
rather sets the scene for further research that may offer greater insights. 
 
Sutherland (2006) identifies that, since the 1990 adoption of Directive 90/387/EEC, the 
predominant strategic objective (from the perspective of political and regulatory actors) in the 
European Union telecommunications sector has been to “create an open and borderless 
internal market allowing the free movement of services, in effect access to those services”15.   
Special rights in the provision of telecommunications equipment and services, with the 
exception of voice telephony, were removed by Directive 90/388/EEC, and Directive 
95/62/EC was adopted to ensure the harmonisation of the conditions for open access to public 
fixed networks.  Directives 96/2/EC and 96/19/EC removed any special rights remaining in 
any member states in respect of the provision of mobile and voice telephony respectively.  
These were followed by Directives on licensing (97/13/EC) and interconnection (97/33/EC) 
and the use of cable television networks to provide services (95/51/EC).  In 1998, the council 
agreed to a framework for universal service.  These, and many other similar directives and 
decisions, constitute the broad legal frameworks at level 3 in the European Union 
telecommunications sector.   As can be seen, the framework is far-reaching, with implications 
for actors (level 1) and arrangements (level 2) in all of the technologies, markets and policies 
segments of the sector. 
                                                     
14 Kelly (2006).   
15 Sutherland (2006) p 3.   
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 However, both Sutherland (2006) and Hocepied and de Streel (2005) identify that in addition 
to creating a framework of legal rules and policies governing the sector, the European Union 
as the over-arching government entity has also imposed asset of rules requiring the 
implementation of “a common framework of quasi-independent national regulatory 
authorities”16.  Thus, the framework specifies not just the broad over-arching ‘legal rules of 
the game’, but also requires a specific set of actors (national regulatory authorities – NRAs – 
level 1) with regulatory jurisdiction over limited geographic subsets of the European Union.  
The Commission is assisted in carrying out its Directives by the Communications Committee 
(COCOM), which is a “standard Committee composed of representatives of the member 
states”17.  However, “the framework sets the basis for a co-ordinated policy across Europe … 
but without forcing Member States to agree or granting the Commission specific powers 
beyond recommending common approaches”18 .    
 
An initial examination using the ‘levels’ approach suggests that the imposition of such an 
institutional change upon the sector will be, on the basis of Koppenjan and Groenewegen’s 
analysis, extremely difficult to carry out.  Indeed, it may provide a graphic illustration of the 
problems incurred when imposing a set of structures into contexts where they may not be 
optimal, at least in pursuing the chosen objective.    
 
Firstly, the EU directives allow each NRA to enter into customised agreements (level 2) with 
the actors participating in each of their geographical territories, as long as these agreements 
are within the frameworks of the level 3 rules.  Hocepied and de Streel observe that the wide 
range of discretionary powers granted to NRAs allow the sector to evolve rapidly and 
unpredictably in response to changes in a manner that would not be appropriate to “freeze in 
hard-law instruments a policy vision based on a specific market design based upon a specific 
market design reflecting a political agreement achieved at a specific moment in time”19 in a 
volatile sector.  Given that Koppenjan and Groenewegen suggest that the stability in the level 
3 rules and level 2 arrangements are important aids in reducing uncertainty in the sector, and 
must be traded off against the losses arising from incongruent arrangements arising from 
rigidities, the explanation offered to support flexibility appears to be incomplete.  It is likely 
that, true to the formation of agreements amongst divergent parties being determined 
ultimately by compromises, the underlying reason for flexibility is more accurately captured 
in Hocepeid and de Streel’s further observation that using non-modifiable hard-law 
                                                     
16 Sutherland (2006) p 6.   
17 Hocepied and de Streel (2005) p 13. 
18 Hocepied and de Streel (2005) p 6.   
19 Hocepied and de Streel (2005) p 14.   
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instruments “was not feasible politically due to the diverging positions of the Member 
States”20.   
 
Thus, the very formation of the ‘common market institution’ was itself the outcome of a set of 
institutional interactions and relationships, with even wider political institutional contexts 
shaping the outcome of the wider telecommunications market, despite the clear objectives 
held for this sector and the institutions within it.   As the objectives of the ‘winners’ from the 
these rule-changing compromises in the political institutions are likely incongruent with those 
of the Commission with respect to the telecommunications agenda (e.g. individual states may 
wish to preserve differences in order to satisfy others via their own political compromises, 
and prioritise this more highly than furthering the common telecommunications market), the 
ability of the proposed changes to achieve the desired objectives has itself been compromised 
from the outset.  Thus, failure to achieve the aims may have been predictable.   
 
Secondly, the actors with whom each of the NRAs interact are essentially different, as a 
consequence of the substantially different historic paths of regulation in each of the member 
states.  Each state has had its own incumbent telephony provider, which is (in most states) at 
some point along the path to privatisation.  Whilst some incumbent providers are already fully 
privatised, and have been engaged in interacting with a well-established NRA for an extended 
period, enabling a mature set of level 2 agreements to be developed (e.g. the United 
Kingdom), others are at different stages, in both privatisation and the maturity of the NRA 
(e.g. the former communist states in Eastern Europe.  Each geographic environment will have 
also experienced different patterns of competitor entry, depending upon the nature of historic 
infrastructure investment, consumer tastes and preferences, and commercial opportunities 
(e.g. the industry types, infrastructure costs, etc. differ across the region).   
 
Consequently, the agreements (level 2) reached by each of the NRAs in its relevant market 
will be shaped by the different cultures, norms, values (level 4) and actors (level 1) that have 
historically participated.  As these agreements are, due to the powers of the NRAs, the 
essential rules defining interaction in the ‘market’ institution, and all will be different, then it 
would appear that, necessarily, there will be twenty-five distinct markets.  It is therefore 
unsurprising to find that wide variations also exist in the ranges of responsibilities NRAs are 
required to undertake (e.g. post, railways, content)21, as these are determined in part by the 
identity of the actors, and the balance of power between them.   
                                                     
20 Ibid.   
21 Professor Arnbak’s lecture  ‘Tasks and Status of National Regulatory Authorities in the EU’ 30/8/06.   
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 Thirdly, the existence of twenty-five distinct sets of rules will itself ensure that each 
geographic market will continue to pursue an independent development path.  The rules and 
cultures themselves will lead to different actors participating in, and shaping the ongoing 
development of the different sets of rules.  For example, the level 2 agreements in one NRA 
territory may have evolved to favour one set of actors over others (e.g. mobile infrastructures 
over fixed infrastructures; service providers over infrastructure providers), whereas in 
another, the reverse may apply.  Long-standing interactions between specific individuals 
familiar with the prevailing cultures norms and values in a specific NRA territory will 
necessarily increase the likelihood of the level 2 agreements being shaped, either knowingly 
or unknowingly, in favour of those who are more familiar with both the explicit and implicit 
‘rules of the game’ and therefore more likely to secure both agreements and changes to the 
rules that further their own individual advantage.  Such biases create entry barriers for actors 
who are less knowledgeable of these implicit rules in each NRA territory, further skewing the 
distributions of actors and leading to differences between countries.  The degree of influence 
by different parties may also in part account for some of the differences observed in the level 
3 rules in the member countries (e.g. the different appeals processes applying to NRA 
decisions)22.   
 
As the interactions between actors and rules will tend to be self-reinforcing across time, such 
patterns are likely to become entrenched.  Without specific intervention, the differences 
between countries are likely to increase further, making it harder to achieve a ‘common 
market’, despite the intentions of the Commission and the over-arching laws and policies 
governing the sector.  Thus, the institutional analysis provides a plausible partial explanation 
for the absence of evidence extensive cross-border entry by established firms into other EU 
NRA markets, and why even in markets for new technologies (e.g. mobile) the pattern of 
entry appears to be clustered around markets with common cultural (including the ‘culture’ of 
historical interaction and legal frameworks) and geographic characteristics – Figure 2.     
 
Taking into account the preceding discussion, it is instructive to analyse the response of the 
European Commission to the apparent failure to create the desired single market.  Perhaps 
predictably, the response has been again to resort to structural solutions, supported by further 
level 3 rules and attempts to apply more centralised, standardised arrangements at level 2 in 
each of the member states.   
 
                                                     
22 Ibid.   
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The Independent Regulatory Group (IRG) was established in 1997 as an informal group of 
NRAs and other European country members, without the Commission, to share experiences 
and exchange points of view on issues of common interest, and to look at “specific regulatory 
issues and decides principles of implementation and best practices (PIBs)”23.  As an initiative 
of the regulatory actors, it can be considered as an emergent set of arrangements at level 2 of 
the broad ICTS sector, with its PIBs contributing to shaping the agreements between the 
NRAs and other actors the arrangements at level 2.  Its formation, and the tasks that it 
undertakes, were likely determined endogenously by the growing differences in the 
implementation of regulation across the EU, and can be seen as a quite predictable outcome in 
a sector where there are not only underlying cultural and actor differences, but also 
considerable freedoms and uncertainties as a consequence of the political compromises in the 
original establishment of the common market objectives, rules and institutions.   
 
The European Regulators Group (ERG) was established by the Commission in 2002.  It is a 
formal body, possibly exogenously imposed albeit as a consequence of internal observations 
of incongruence.  It is comprised of the NRAs of each Member State and the Commission, 
and it “aims to provide an interface between the NRAs and the Commission to contribute to 
the development of common regulatory culture.  To do so, the ERG looks in more detail to 
certain particular and politically sensitive problems and tries to develop a common approach, 
such as remedies, bitstream and LRIC methodology”24.  As a formally constituted instrument 
of the Commission, the common methodologies proposed by the ERG are closer to level 3 
laws than the level 2 PIBs advocated by the IRG.  Furthermore, the presence of the 
Commission on the ERG suggests an ‘upward-looking’ focus in the hierarchy of political 
accountabilities and influences.  Whilst the issues of ‘culture’ are acknowledged, it is noted 
that these are focused more on creating a common culture amongst regulators and regulatory 
activities specifically, rather than recognising, understanding or attempting to alter all of the 
level 4 cultures, values, norms and attitudes that shape both the wider market institution and 
the national markets in each of the member countries.   
 
The IRG and ERG are both examples of structural changes within the regulatory component 
of the ICTS/telecommunications sector.  Yet, this component comprises only one third of the 
forces shaping the sector.  Whilst the regulatory objective may be to create a common market, 
it is not at all clear that the forces from the technological and market components are naturally 
focused towards achieving this objective.  If, as discussed in section one, regulators are at an 
informational disadvantage, and repeated interactions reinforce differences, making it harder 
                                                     
23 Ibid, p 13.   
24 Ibid, p 13 
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for regulators to firstly detect relevant information, and secondly effectively transact with 
other sector participants, then it may be that the single market may never be achievable as 
long as it is not in the interests of individual actors with power to influence decision and 
rulemaking to deliver a sector with this outcome. In this event, a more achievable objective 
for regulators may be to restrict the extent of losses occurring as a consequence of the 
incongruities, as, given past interactions, the task of reconfiguring relationships towards a 
single market may be beyond the power of any one component part, or so disruptive of 
existing relationships that the costs outweigh the benefits.   
 
Conclusion 
As Koppenjan and Groenewegen (2005) observe, “institutions are often an easy target of 
attempts to reform”25.  However, they are hard to change.  While designers may know what 
the design variables are, much less is known about the effects that combinations of design 
variables produce.  Theoretical insights and practical experiences are helpful, but 
“institutional analysis should steer the design, while at the same time keeping an eye out for 
unintended effects”26.   From the very preliminary analysis of this paper, it would appear that 
these cautions apply equally to the desires and designs of policy-makers seeking to influence 
the shape of industry sectors and the design of the institutions that these same policy-makers 
create to implement their visions.  The application of institutional economics appears to offer 
much, both in assisting the design of institutions, but also in the understanding of how sectors 







                                                     
25 Koppenjan and Groenewald (2005) p 7.   
26 Koppenjan and Groenewald (2005) p 11. 
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Figure 1: Criteria for Economic Growth in the ICTS Sector 
 
 
Source: Melody (2002) p 9.   
 
Figure 2: A Fragmented Mobile Market – Corporate Presence in the EU 
 
 
Source: Sutherland (2006a) p 5.   
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